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In an article appearing in this journal in 2008,' Fatma E. Marouf identified
a worrisome development in asylum law: refugees persecuted because of their
membership in a "particular social group"-one of the five grounds for asylum
in the United States 2-must now show that their group is "socially visible"
in the country from which they fled.' For the past five years, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) 4 and the federal courts have increasingly relied on this
social visibility criterion to deny asylum claims. Groups deemed insufficiently
visible range from youth who resist gangs, to whistleblowers, to women who
have children outside of wedlock.s Meanwhile, calls to abolish the requirement
have grown louder. In the past several months, advocates have sought to
challenge social visibility through legislation,' executive action,7 and judicial
1. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a
"Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to
Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 47 (2oo8).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § nol(a)(42) (2oo6); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2006).
3. See C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951 (B.L.A. 20o6).
4. The BIA, part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review in the Department
of Justice, consists of fifteen members appointed by the Attorney General. The
Board reviews decisions made by immigration judges under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Larios v. Holder, 6o8 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2010); Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93
(2d Cir. 20o) (remanding for the BIA to reconsider its denial of whistleblower's
asylum claim); Faye v. Holder, 580 F.3d 37 (Ist Cir. 2009).
6. See Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, nth Cong. § 5(a) (2010).
7. Under 8 C.F.R. §10o3.1(h)(1)(i) (20io), the Attorney General may direct the BIA to
refer cases to him for review. A variety of groups have called for Attorney General
Holder to certify S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008), a recent social group
case. See Matter of S-E-G- and Gang-Based Asylum Claims, IMMIGRANT LAW
CENTER OF MINNESOTA, http://www.immigrantlawcentermn.org/Litigation/seg
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intervention. This Comment argues that those attempts have been misguided;
"social visibility" only needs to be properly understood, not discarded.
Maroufs article shows how the BIA borrowed its social visibility criterion
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), then
turned the UNHCR's alternative analysis of social groups into a necessary
requirement. Marouf thus offers compelling evidence that the new criterion is a
departure both from international law and the Board's own precedent.9 She also
exposes the dangerous implications of the social visibility requirement for gay
and lesbian refugees and any other asylum applicants who keep their group-
defining characteristics from public view."
What Maroufs otherwise helpful analysis overlooks is a misunderstanding
at the heart of the social visibility requirement. The confusion arises because
"social visibility" is a metaphor. Groups are "socially visible" when a society
"sees" itself-that is, thinks of itself-as divided into such groups. This Com-
ment argues that only this cognitive understanding of visibility makes sense in
the context of asylum. Yet often the BIA and the courts instead take "social
visibility" literally, requiring that members of a group look a certain way in or-
der to gain asylum. The literalist reading makes social visibility turn on a
group's appearance rather than its social salience. As one immigration judge
recently said of an asylum applicant from Colombia, "it is unlikely that anyone
would be able to tell from looking at him that he is HIV positive."" Unable lit-
erally to see the applicant as "part of any particular social group," the judge
denied his claim. 2
By reducing knowledge to sight, those adjudicating and litigating asylum
cases have failed to "see" what the visibility criterion can contribute to our defi-
nition of social groups. Properly interpreted, the visibility criterion serves as
a test of objectivity (or at least intersubjectivity); it prevents applicants from
concocting ad hoc social groups in their quest for asylum. What it does not do
.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (collecting requests for certification from various
organizations). Another route to reform would require new regulations, which
the Department of Homeland Security has pledged to formulate. See Unified
Agenda, Department of Homeland Security, Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 74
Fed. Reg. 64,213, 64,220 (Dec. 7, 2009).
8. In May 2010, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Contreras-
Martinez v. Holder, a social visibility case from the Fourth Circuit. 346 F. App'x
956 (4th Cir. zoog), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3274 (2010).
q. Maroufs article was cited for this purpose in a recent brief to the Supreme Court.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 130 S. Ct.
3274 (2010) (No. 09-830).
10. Marouf, supra note 1, at 78-1o2.
it. Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen., No. 09-2593, slip op. at 4-5 (3d Cir. May 20, 2010).
12. Id. Affirming on alternate grounds, neither the Board nor the Third Circuit
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is demand that individuals be visually recognizable as group members in order
for courts to recognize their asylum claims.
The argument that follows is divided into three parts. Part I provides back-
ground on how the visibility criterion, and the confusion surrounding it, arose
from the BIA's social group opinions. Part 11 suggests that confusion between
the metaphorical and literal understandings of visibility aided the latter's accep-
tance by courts reviewing the Board's new criterion, even as it has intensified
resistance to the criterion by advocates and commentators. Part III argues that
clarification would decrease the demands for courts, Congress, and the Execu-
tive Branch to drop the social visibility requirement altogether. Rather than ab-
andon the criterion, the government need only reaffirm what should be ob-
vious: Social visibility has nothing to do with how groups look.
I. THE NEW VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT
Those who seek asylum in the United States must establish that "race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
was or will be at least one central reason" for their persecution in their country
of origin.'3 Of the five grounds, "membership in a particular social group" has
long proven the most vexing.14
For years, the leading definition of "particular social group" came from
Matter of Acosta," a 1985 BIA opinion. There, the Board applied the doctrine of
ejusdem generisl6 to analogize social groups to the other four grounds (race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion), which were said to involve "some-
thing that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or that is
so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed."' 7 The Board held that social groups consist of individuals who "share
a common, immutable characteristic," whether "an innate one such as sex, col-
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)(B) (2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § noi(a)(42) (2006). The statuto-
ry language stems from Article I of the United Nations' 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S&T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
14. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (Alito, J.) ("Both courts and
commentators have struggled to define 'particular social group.' Read in its
broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended.").
15. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
16. "Meaning literally 'of the same kind,"' the ejusdem generis canon instructs that
"[wlhere general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the gen-
eral words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D.
SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at 357-60
(7th ed. 2007).
17. Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 233-34.
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or, or kinship ties, or... a shared past experience such as former military lea-
dership or land ownership."'"
This definition remained largely undisturbed for two decades.'9 Not until
2oo6 did the BIA offer social visibility as an additional requirement. In Matter of
C-A-, the Board noted and tacitly altered the meaning of two sources: Gomez v.
INS, a 1991 Second Circuit opinion that the Board summarized as requiring
"members of a social group be externally distinguishable,"o and UNHCR
guidelines describing social groups as persons "who share a common characte-
ristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group
by society."21 Fatma Maroufs article shows how the BIA, in a short sequence
of opinions, began to construe the UNHCR's "or" as an "and."" Even quicker,
however, was the Board's shift within Matter of C-A- from groups that are
"easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups"23
to the claim that previous decisions "recognizing particular social groups in-
volved characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by others in the
country in question." 4 This shift from figurative to literal sight occurred in the
space of a single paragraph, and allowed the BIA to conclude that informants
against a Colombian drug cartel do not constitute a social group, since their
conduct "is generally out of the public view.""
18. Id. at 233.
19. After describing five intervening cases in which it had applied the Acosta standard,
the Board in 2006 reconfirmed that, "[hiaving reviewed the range of approaches
to defining particular social group [sic], we continue to adhere to the Acosta for-
mulation." C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 956 (B.I.A. 2oo6).
20. Id. More precisely, Gomez v. INS held that "[a) particular social group is com-
prised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor - or in the eyes of the
outside world in general." 947 F.2d 66o, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
21. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular
Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or
its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/o2/o2
(May 7, 2002) (emphasis added); cf. C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 956.
22. Marouf, supra note i, at 66-67.
23. C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 959 (emphases added).
24. Id. at 960 (emphases added). Strangely, the BIA cited as support Toboso-Alfonso,
20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990), in which the social group consisted of "persons
identified as homosexuals by the Cuban Government." C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
955; see Marouf, supra note 1. Surely Cuban homosexuals, no less than Colombian
informants, generally conduct their activity "out of the public view." See infra
note 25 and accompanying text.
25. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
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The BIA followed Matter of C-A- with opinions in 2007" and 20087 that
confirmed "social visibility" as a necessary element for social group claims. One
2008 opinion, Matter of E-A-G-, demonstrated how the new requirement could
prove fatal to an asylum claim:
[W]e find that the particular social group identified by the Immigra-
tion Judge as "persons resistant to gang membership" lacks the social
visibility that would allow others to identify its members as part of such
a group. Persons who resist joining gangs have not been shown to
be part of a socially visible group within Honduran society, and the res-
pondent does not allege that he possesses any characteristics that would
cause others in Honduran society to recognize him as one who has re-
fused gang recruitment.'
As in C-A-, the Board equivocates between multiple interpretations of "identifi-
cation," "visibility," and "recognition." Initially, the phrase "social visibility"
describes categories by which individuals are cognitively identified. By the final
lines, it becomes clear that some physical demarcation is required. Visibility
comes to require recognition not in the metaphorical sense, as when govern-
ments recognize each other or courts recognize claims, but in the literal sense,
as a wanted poster helps people recognize a fugitive.
II. Two MEANINGS OF 'VISIBILITY'
The confusion that arises from the Board's recent social group decisions
raises questions about what the new visibility criterion actually adds to the pre-
vious Acosta formulation. 9 Two possible interpretations, with the additions
to Acosta in italics, are:
(a) a social group must be based on a trait that is recognized by society
as either unchangeable or fundamental to conscience; or
(b) a social group must be based on a visibly recognizable trait that is
either unchangeable or fundamental to conscience.
Phrased so starkly, it becomes difficult to defend (b) as a legitimate inter-
pretation of the statutory text. In the list "race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion,""o visibility is hardly
the common element; race may be visible to the eye, but religion and political
26. A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
27. E-A-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); S-E-G-, 24 . & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2oo8).
28. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594 (emphases added).
29. The Board insists that it "continue lsI to adhere to the Acosta formulation." See C-
A-, 231. & N. Dec. at 956.
30. 8 U.S.C. § nioi(a)(42)(A) (2oo6).
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opinion generally require "evidence of things not seen."1 Were it not for the
metaphorical connection between sight and knowledge, seeing social groups
would be no more plausibly required than having to hear or smell them.
Interpretation (a) merely amends the Acosta definition to reflect its actual
use. Despite Acosta's language, not every immutable characteristic forms the ba-
sis of a cognizable social group." "Having been born in the morning" is an im-
mutable characteristic, but the "morning-born" are unlikely to qualify as a valid
social group, since societies generally do not carve themselves up along that
particular joint. In its cognitive sense, social visibility establishes whether a
purported group is recognized in the refugee's country of origin; it protects
against ad hoc formulations invented for the purpose of an asylum applica-
tion.33
Reading (a) is what the Board offers when it interprets the statutory
language governing asylum. However, when it applies the visibility criterion to
the facts of its social group cases, the Board takes a pivotal second step, shifting
to reading (b) and interpreting literally words such as "perception," "recogni-
tion," "identification," and "visibility."
Consider again Matter of C-A-, where the Board states its criterion in cog-
nitive terms at the outset: "[W] e have considered as a relevant factor the extent
to which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question
as members of a social group." 4 Substitute "think of" for "perceive" and the
meaning remains unchanged. However, when the Board applies the criterion,
it claims that "the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally
out of the public view. . . . Recognizability or visibility is limited to those infor-
31. Hebrews :m (defining faith); cf Antipova v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1264-65
(iith Cir. 2004) (those seeking asylum need not "avoid signaling to others that
they are indeed members of a particular race, or adherents of a certain religion,
etc.").
32. As Acosta's definition has never been taken literally, enshrining that definition in
the Refugee Protection Act of 2olo may cause confusion. The Act requires that
"any group whose members share a characteristic that is either immutable or fun-
damental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person's human rights
such that the person should not be required to change it, shall be deemed a par-
ticular social group, without any additional requirement." S. 3113, inth Cong.
§ 5(a) (20to).
33. Consider the social group asserted in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 .3d 1029, 1034 (8th
Cir. 2008): "[Alny widowed Cameroonian female member of the Bamileke tribe,
in the Southern region [of Cameroon) that belongs to a family or has in-laws
from a different tribe and region, [namely] the Bikom tribe in the Northwest
province, who have falsely accused her of causing her husband's death." Citing
Matter of C-A-, the Eighth Circuit held that, "[tJhe BIA was correct to reject the
first asserted social group because Ngengwe's definition is too narrow; people
with those characteristics are not perceived by society as a particular social
group." Id.
34. C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 957.
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mants who are discovered because they appear as witnesses . . . ." Perception
and recognition now require physical appearance in public view. The words
hardly change, but their meaning is literalized, the requirement is heightened,
and the applicant's claim is ultimately denied.
Because the Board couches both (a) and (b) in the same words, the unhelp-
fulness or even irrationality of reading (b) has largely escaped judicial atten-
tion. 6 Courts of appeals reviewing the visibility criterion generally consider
the Board's initial cognitive formulations rather than the literalist ones that fol-
low. For example, the Second Circuit has described C-A- as holding that "a
group's 'visibility'-meaning the extent to which members of society perceive
those with the relevant characteristic as members of a social group-is a factor
in determining whether it constitutes a particular social group under the [Im-
migration and Nationality Acti)."7 In other words, the Second Circuit unders-
tood C-A-'s language as metaphorical, found it reasonable, and granted the
Board deference on that basis. The literalist reading of social visibility evaded
review entirely.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, FUTURE APPROACHES
As social group claims increasingly fail the visibility requirement, advocates
have heightened their efforts to abolish it. Three routes are available: the Attor-
ney General or the BIA itself could reconsider the Board's precedent"8 the
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court could refuse to grant deference to the
BIA's interpretation of "particular social groups";39 or Congress could pass leg-
islation clarifying or altering the statute.4o
Yet what the foregoing analysis suggests is that advocates working to have
the visibility criterion abolished might do better to see that it is properly ap-
plied. Distinguishing between the metaphorical and literal interpretations of so-
35. Id. at 960.
36. For the exceptions, see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
37. Koudriachova v. Gonzales. 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing C-A-, 23 1. & N.
Dec. at 957, 959-60); see also, e.g., Feng Ming Lin v. Holder, 339 F. App'x 102, 103
(2d Cir. 2009) (requiring that the petitioner "show that the group she describes is
generally perceived as a discrete group by Chinese society"); Malonga v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959-61) ("[T]he
more likely that the society at large recognizes the alleged group (by, for example,
linguistic or kinship commonalities), the more likely that the group is a particular
social group for purposes of withholding of removal.").
38. See supra note 7.
39. For a recent case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus refusing to
examine social groups, see supra note 8.
40. For one recent legislative proposal, see supra note 6.
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cial visibility would allow litigants and policy makers to focus on the truly
harmful, and more readily corrected, prevalence of the literalist interpretation.
Recent judicial developments suggest an emerging recognition of visibility's
dual meaning. In 2oo, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner twice skewered
the Board's visibility approach. In Gatimi v. Holder, the court found that the vi-
sibility requirement not only conflicted with prior precedent, but worse, that it
"makes no sense."4 ' Where the Board had conflated both interpretations of visi-
bility,42 the court of appeals focused only on the literal one. Four months later,
the court explicitly distinguished the two meanings in Benitez Ramos v. Holder.43
Referring to metaphorical visibility as the "external criterion" (because it relies
on societal beliefs), Judge Posner observed: "Often it is unclear whether the
Board is using the term 'social visibility' in the literal sense or in the 'external
criterion' sense, or even whether it understands the difference."44
At oral argument in Benitez Ramos, the government insisted that social vi-
sibility requires a "discernible characteristic" that would allow a "complete
stranger" to identify a group member on the street.4 1 Yet this insistence conflicts
with a second judicial development: a brief filed by the Solicitor General in the
Supreme Court last April denying that "members of a particular social group
must literally be visible to the naked eye."46 Conceding that the governments
earlier arguments might have "contributed to the confusion," the Solicitor Gen-
eral maintained that "the Board's precedential decisions have equated 'social
visibility' with the extent to which the relevant society perceives there to be a
group in the first place, rather than the ease with which one may necessarily be
able to identify particular individuals as members of such a group."47
As a description of the Board's past decisions, this is simply incorrect. The
Board has repeatedly required literal visibility, as shown above, denying claims
41. 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). Judge Posner rejected "the Board's view, that the
[only way the] Mungiki defectors can qualify as members of a particular social
group is by pinning a target to their backs with the legend 'I am a Mungiki defec-
tor."' Id. at 616.
42. Compare id. at 615 ("The Board said there was no evidence that Gatimi 'possesses
any characteristics that would cause others in Kenyan society to recognize him as
a former member of Mungiki . . . ."'), with id. ('"There is no showing that ... such
individuals are seen as a segment of the population in any meaningful respect."').
43. See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F-3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009). Since the Seventh Cir-
cuit is currently alone in rejecting the literalist interpretation, asylum applicants
from non-visible social groups would do well to file their claims in Illinois, Indi-
ana, or Wisconsin.
44. Id. at 430.
45. Id.
46. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 13, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 130 S.
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as a result. Yet insofar as the non-literal reading is now the official litigation po-
sition of the federal government, the Solicitor General's statement is moment-
ous. Though still underappreciated, it should be seen as a major victory for op-
ponents of the visibility criterion.48
The importance of the government's concession was not fully recognized,
even by the parties litigating the case in which it was made. Replying to the Soli-
citor General, lawyers seeking Supreme Court review of their client's asylum
denial noted in passing that the government's new interpretation of visibility
could provide grounds for reversal. However, they immediately went on to
claim that uncertainty surrounding the visibility requirement "underscores the
bankruptcy of the BIA's approach (and the inappropriateness of any social-
visibility requirement)."49
The government's belated recognition of the difference between literal and
metaphorical understandings of social visibility-and its explicit rejection of the
former-provides an opportunity not to be missed. Those troubled by the visi-
bility criterion should see the government's move for what it is: a fundamental
change of course that, if encouraged, could end the confusion that has caused so
much harm to asylum-seekers for the past five years.
48. One factor that clouds the victory is the uncertain relationship between the Solici-
tor General's litigation positions and the precedential decisions of the BIA. The
need for the Department of Justice to present a unified stance is complicated by
the fact that the Board and the Solicitor General are both based in the Depart-
ment-and that the Office of Immigration Litigation, which represents the
Board's position in the courts of appeals, also defers to positions taken by the So-
licitor General. Cases such as this in which those positions are at odds present a
particular need for resolution by the Attorney General. See supra note 7 (explain-
ing the procedure by which the Attorney General can review BIA decisions).
49. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9-1o, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 130 S. Ct 3274
(2010) (No. 09-830).
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